

## EPISTEMIC JUSTIFICATION

The “classical” definition of propositional knowledge: *justified true belief (JTB)*.

The two counter examples of Edmund Gettier show that JTB is an insufficient definition for knowledge.

Pessimistic opinion: “In spite of the vast literature that Gettier’s brief paper elicited, there is still no widespread agreement as to whether the Gettier problem has been solved, nor as to what constitutes the most promising line of research” (Robert Shope).

Optimistic opinion: “Even those convinced by Gettier that justification (along with truth) isn’t *sufficient* for knowledge still mostly think it *necessary* and *nearly sufficient* for knowledge” (Alvin Platinga).

### ATTEMPTS AT SOLVING THE GETTIER PROBLEM

1. AUTHORS, TRYING TO GET RID OF THE PROBLEM:	The presented cases by Gettier cannot help him to deny the general validity of JTB. This argument, though theoretically relevant (false premises cannot serve for a true inference), does not work practically.
2. IN SEARCH OF AN ADEQUATE THEORY OF JUSTIFICATION:	Too many such theories, each of which displays its own flaws and limitations.
3. SUGGESTIONS JTB TO BE AMENDED:	A fourth component to JTB is being looked for, in order a proper definition to be reached, that will not be susceptible to Gettier-style cases. The gist of those attempts is JTB to be strengthened into <i>undefeatedly justified true belief</i> .
4. MY WAY OUT OF THE PROBLEM:	My solution is not concerned with any extension of JTB, but is aiming at an elucidation of the cognitive cause that makes the Gettier problem possible. I also agree, that it is really the first component of JTB that cries for an additional analysis; but I indulge in a philosophical, rather than in a formal strategy.